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VALIDITY UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT OF
A UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICE OF ONE SELLER
By

NEIL C. HEAD*

T

HE Federal Trade Commission attacks on the so-called basingpoint method of price quotations have been high-lighted by
the recent Supreme Court decisions in Corn Products Refining
Co. v. F. T C.1 and F T. C. v.A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,2
and the Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Aetna Portland Centent
Co. v. F. T. C.3
What is not generally realized, however, is that the attack on
the basing-point method is only part of a general campaign by
the Commission against the pricing methods in general use in
American industry. This campaign has progressed so far that the
Commission is now attacking the use by a single seller of a uniform delivered price to all customers, wherever located,-one price
across the country.
Of the many commercial advantages of a one-price policy, two
in particular, the power to name the price in national advertising
and thus identify the product with a moderate price, and the avoidance of accounting costs which in some cases may exceed the
transportation costs, have caused this method to be very generally
adopted by manufacturers, particularly in consumer goods industries. These manufacturers,. the public, and even many lawyers,
may be surprised to find that such a one-price policy is regarded
by the Federal Trade Commission as "discrimination" within the
4
meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.

This article is devoted to examining the validity under that
Act, of such a one-price policy.5 It is the author's conviction,
shared it is believed by most lawyers, that the Commission's position is legdlly unsound.
*Member of the Bars of Illinois, Massachusetts and New York. Member,
Cahill, Gordon, Zachry & Reindal, New York, N. Y.

1(1945) 324 U. S.726, 65 S. Ct. 961, 89 L. Ed. 1320.
2(1945) 324 U. S. 746, 65 S. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed. 1338.
3(C. C. A. 7, 1946), 157 F. (2d) 533; cert. granted March 10, 1947
For convenience, this case will be called "the Cement case."
4
Clayton Act, Sec. 2, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526 5(1936) 15 U. S. C. 13.
For a discussion of the broad question of the legality of freight absorption, see Hilder, The Attack upon Delivered Price Systems, (1946) 14 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev., 397, and Wooden (1946), The Defense of Delivered Price
Systems, 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., 1.
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At the outset, to avoid confusion, it is advisable to define the
different pricing methods in common use.
I. PRICING METHODS

IN

COMMON

USE

1. F.o.b mill
The seller quotes a uniform price f.o.b. mill: The buyer pays
the full freight from the mill to destination. This method results
in uniform mill nets 6 on all sales. The cost to the buyers at (lestination varies.

This is the only inethod of pricing wchich the Coimission says
is not open to attack under the Robinson-Patiman Act.
The other common pricing methods, all of which are under
attack by the Commission, are as follows
Uniform delivered price
The seller quotes the same price at all destinations to all buyers.
The seller pays the full freight. This method results in varying
mill nets but the same delivered price at all destinations. This is
the method with which we are here concerned.
2.

3.

Freight equalization
The seller quotes a delivered price made up of a base price
plus the freight to destination, except where this delivered price
would be greater than that quoted by a competitor nearer the destination, and thus with a lower freight rate. In such cases, the seller
absorbs enough of the freight from his mill to give a delivered price
no greater than that of the nearer competitor He thus equalizes
his freight on that of the nearer competitor to meet the competitor's
lower price. This method results in uniform mill nets, except on
sales where the seller, to meet the lower price of a competitor, absorbs part of the freight. The price to the buyers at destination
varies. This is the method attacked in the Cenient case.
Zone delivered prices
The seller divides the country into two or more geograplhical
zones, and quotes a uniform delivered price to all buyers within
each zone. The delivered price varies between the different zones.
The seller pays the full freight. This results in varying mill nets,
and in uniform delivered prices within each zone but varying
delivered prices between zones.

4.

6
The term "mill net," as used here, means that part of the sales price
realized by the seller after deduction of delivery costs.
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5.

F.o.b. a basing point other than point of shipment
The seller quotes a price which includes freight from a point
other than the point of supment. To the extent that the freight
from this point exceeds the actual freight from the point of shipment, the seller collects what is called "phantom freight", to the
extent that the freight from the basing point is less than actual
freight, the seller absorbs the difference. This results in varying
delivered costs and in varying mill nets. This method was condemned in the Corn Prodictscase.
The form of price quotation does not determine, and may not
even indicate on its face, which of the above methods is actually
being used. A seller may quote "f.o.b. mill," to put the risk of
loss in transit on the buyer; yet by "allowing full freight to destination," actually be quoting what is defined above as a "uniform
delivered price." Similarly, what is in form a "delivered price"
quotation may be used in an "f.o.b. mill" pncing method, if the
seller is quoting to each customer varying "delivered prices," each
made up of a uniform f.o.b. mill price plus actual freight to destination.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST

DELIVERED PRICES
The term "uniform delivered price" is sometimes used to designate the use of the same delivered price by several sellers at a
single point. We, on the other-hand, are using it to describe the
price policy of a single seller. These two uses of the term "uniform" must be carefully differentiated, particularly since both
may exist in the same situation and the same term be used to describe each. While outside the scope of this article, it may be helpful to sketch briefly the development of the Commission's attack
on the use by several sellers of the same delivered price.
7Fort Howard Paper Co. v. F T. C., (C.C.A. 7, 1946) 156 F. (2d)
899, cert. den. (1947) 67 S. Ct. 439; The Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v.
F. T. C., (C. C. A. 7, 1946), 152 F (2d) 478; U. S. Maltsters Assn. v.
F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7, 1946), 152 F (2d) 161; Eugene Dietzgen Co. v.
F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7, 1944), 142 F (2d) 321; Salt Producers Ass'n v.
F. T. C., (C.C.A. 7, 1943), 134 F. (2d) 354.
While the Commission has no jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman
Act as such, a combination or agreement in restraint of trade, illegal under
the Sherman Act, may also be an unfair method of competition under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comussion Act, and the courts have
upheld cease and desist orders by the Commission under that Section
against price fixing agreements. F T. C. v. Beech-Nut Co., (1922) 257
U. S. 441, 453; 42 S. Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307, Fashion Originators Guild
of America v. F. T. C., (1941) 312 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 703, 85 L. Ed. 949;
F. T. C. v. Pacific States Paper Trade Assn., (1927) 273 U. S. 52, 47
S. Ct. 255,71 L. Ed. 534.
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The Commission views with suspicion any uniformity of delivered prices of several sellers, and has regarded such uniformity
as strong evidence of the existence of conspiracy or agreement,
illegal as an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 7 The courts have gone far in supporting the Commission's findings and orders based on such inferences.8
The sellers maintained that uniformity of price at a given
destination was the result of competition, not of agreement, pointing out that the only price in which the buyer is interested is the
price at his plant. That is where price competition actually occurs
and that is where price competition must be met, if it is to be met
at all.
The Commission itself has admitted that
"* * * uniformity of price in a given market is equally consistent with a condition of free competition or with a condition of
monopoly -I
Mr Wooden, Associate General Counsel of the Commission,
referred to this difficulty of proof in his testimony before the
T N. E. C. on January 30, 1940. He recommended legislation outlawing the basing point system, saying
"As the situation is now, with the outcome of any basing-point
case depending upon the interpretation of the law and the facts
under theories of conspiracy and concerted action which, I think,
are necessary to make the law applicable, it requires an enormous
expenditure of time and effort and labor in establishing that condition in an adversary proceeding for each particular industry and
what the facts are in that industry regarding the basing-point
system. I would say that no more vitally needed legislation within
the scope of this committee can be suggested than that of directly
prohibiting the basing-point system by congressional mandate." 10
In an apparent attempt to eliminate the necessity of proof of
agreement in enforcement proceedings, the Commission, in one
8
For example, in Milk and Ice Cream Can Inst. v. F T C., (C. C. A. 7,
1946), 152 F (2d) 478, the court said.
"To illustrate, a customer located in St. Paul could purchase cans at
the same delivered price irrespective of whether the purchase was nmade
from a member located in Chicago or St. Paul. Just how such an unnatural
situation could be brought about by members of an industry without a plan
or agreement is difficult, if not impossible, to visualize." (p. 481)
This statement completely overlooks the elementary fact that the seller
located in Chicago could make no sales in St. Paul if his price delivered
there9 was higher than the price of the St. Paul manufacturer.
Matter of Cement Institute, 37 F T C. 87, 251 (Findings, Par. 22c),
reported on appeal as Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. F T C., (C.C.A. 7,
1946) 157 F (2d) 533, cert. granted March 10, 1947
loHearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part
27 p. 14329.
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cease and desist order, forbade "common course of action" which
would on its face have prevented individual action by a seller
which happened to be the same as that of a competitor. However,
on appeal, the order was modified to forbid only "planned common course of action." Thus the Commission still had to prove
agreement."
In the Cenwnt case, the Commission made another effort to
get away from having to prove agreement by contending that the
use by a number of sellers of the same price formula was inherently collusive and illegal, even in the absence of agreement.
The court summed up this argument of the Commission as follows
"The Commission states 'It should be understood that it
makes no difference in the results whether particular base prices
are set by each base mill with or without direct collaboration and
direct collusion with other base mills or with their own competitors.' This is a contention born of necessity for, as heretofore
shown, there is no finding of agreement or collusion between respondents as to base prices. The Commission continues 'It is the
method of pricing by formula that produces the identity of delivered
price quotations.' This is a significant statement and apparently
means that it is immaterial whether the identity of delivered price
quotations resulted
from tne conspiracy charged or from inde1
pendent action."'

III. THE ATTACK

ON THE DELIVERED PRICE OF A

SINGLE SELLER

In the meantime, the Commission turned to the RobinsonPatman Act to implement its campaign against uniform delivered
prices by a number of sellers. If the Commission could establish
that the use by a single seller of a delivered price was a discrimination under that Act, there would no longer be any necessity of
proof of agreement among sellers. The Commission therefore
contended that to avoid discrimination under the Robinson-Patman
Act all sales must in effect be made at one price f.o.b. mill, with
all delivery costs charged to the buyer.
While in theory the Commission would concede that it is not
unlawful for the seller to charge a buyer a delivered price which
includes, fully and exactly, the cost of delivery to that buyer, no
more and no less, nevertheless it does unequivocally take the position that to avoid discrimination the selling should be upon a basis
that results in the-same net realization at the mill on all sales-re"Salt
Producers Assn. v. F T. C. (C.C.A. 7; 1943) 134 F (2d) 354.
12
Page 562 of 157 F. (2d).
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gardless of point of delivery Of course, this is in substance the same
thing as selling at one price f.o.b. mill.' 3
This is a startling and far-reaching interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act. Each mill, to the extent of its capacity, would
be given a monopoly in the area in which it had a freight advantage, and no other mill could invade its territory The country
would eventually be split into little Balkan industrial states. 4
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Ceinent case, summed tip
the Commission's objective as follows
"The Commission states 'Under any kind of pricing method
every mill has a substantial and naturally inherent advantage when
quoting on nearby business in real competition with more distant
mills. By the same token every mill has a substantial and naturally
inherent disadvantage when quoting on distant business in competition with mills located nearer to the customer.' This appears
to be a logical statement but the question immediately arises as
to how the Commission proposes to give effect to this 'naturally inherent advantage' and this 'naturally inherent disadvantage. As
we have already shown, it proposes to make supreme the advantage of a mill selling in the territory where it has a freight advantage, and to make its disadvantage so great when selling in a
competitor's territory as to practically preclude it from entering
that market. In fact, the advantage and disadvantage would no
longer be natural but artificial, effected by the requirement that
each mill sell on an f.o.b. mill price." 1'
IV

BASIS FOR THE COIMISSION'S POSITION

The Robinson-Patman Act,"' unlike the Sherman Act, is
directed at the practices of a single seller acting alone, not in
1aMr. Wooden, in an address before the New York State Bar Association on January 22, 1947, said.
"Not infrequently it has been charged that the Commission is obsessed
with the idea that any and all delivered prices are evil, per se, atnd that the
only cure for that evil is uniform f.o.b. mill prices. There is no warrant for
such a charge. There is nothing in the statute and nothing in the Commission's orders to cease and desist that will support it. There is nothing in
either that precludes delivered prices which make due allowance for differences in cost of delivery and which do not injure or prevent competition.

The delivered prices of a single seller which make such due allowance do
produce a uniform net price f.o.b. his mill, but that is not to require f.o.b.
mill pricing." (Robinson-Patman Act Symposium, 1947 Ed., (C.C.H.) p. 39.)

14Mr. Wooden, in answer to a question as to how a manufacturer can
do business in a market in which freight-wise he is not the controlling factor,
said."The only answer I would make to that is that they are not at liberty
under the law, as I see it, to go into distant markets and take less for their
commodity than they get at home, if the result be adverse to the interests
of competition." (Robinson-Patman Act Symposium, 1947 Ed., (C.C.H.)
p. 45.)
15Page 563 of 157 F (2d).
"6The pertinent parts are as follows
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concert with any other person. It forbids discrimination in price
between different purchasers, where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The Act
provides, however, that it shall not prevent differentials in price
"which make only due 'allowance for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery," and the seller may show that his
lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor.
A delivered price which is the same to all buyers would not
seem to involve any discrimination of any kind. Where there.is
no discrimination, no question should arise of the effect on competition, or of differentials because of differences in costs, or of
meeting an equally low price of a competitor.
However, the Federal Trade Commission takes the position
that t uniform delivered price does constitute a discrimination
within the meaning of the Act, since fle net realized at the mill
7
is greater on some sales than on others.1
The Commission presents two arguments to sustain its position.
1. That when the Act prohibits discrimination in price, the
word "price" means the mill net; that is, the net realized after deducting delivery costs.
"Sec. 2 (a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged m commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discrunmate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, * * * where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
* **: Prov'ided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
sale, or delivery, resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered. * * *"
"Sec. 2 (b) * * * Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall prevent a seller rebutting the prina-facie case thus made by showing
that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of
a competitor,
or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
17 Apparently the F. T. C. believes that such a pricing system of an
individual seller also constitutes an unfair method of competition in violation
of Section 5 of the F T. C. Act. See the complaint (issued in 1941) in
Matter of Rigid Steel Conduit Assn. et al, 38 F. T. C. 534. Although
there was no charge of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, the order
forbids:
"Quoting or selling rigid steel conduit at delivered prices which systematically reflect the inclusion of a transportation factor greater or less
than the actual cost of transportation from point of shipment to destination."
(p. 595).
where the effect may be to produce the same delivered price as those of
other respondents. This means that a seller could not absorb freight to sell
m a territory where his competitor had a freight advantage if he quotes the
same delivered price as that of his competitor. This case is now pending on
appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Thus in Count II of its complaint against the Cement Institute,'8 the Commission charged that
"Delivered prices made under the formula set forth in Paragraph Five (b) hereof are not the actual prices received by producing respondents. This is for the reason that such delivered
prices include not only the price of the cement but the price of
its transportation. In order to derive the true price received, the
price actually paid to the carrier for transportation of the cement
to the buyer must be deducted from the delivered price. * * *"P1
In the Rigid Steel Canduat case,20 one finding spoke of the
"mill net or real price." 2 '
2. That since the Act provides that its prohibition of discrimination shall not prevent differentials "which make only due
allowance for the differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or
delivery * * *,"the seller must make allowance for the exact cost
of delivery, neither more nor less.
This was Mr. Wooden's argument when he said
"There can be no discrimination -when due allowance (for differences in cost of delivery) is made. 2There
is always discrimina2
tion when due allowance is not made."
The complaint in the Chain Institute case, in charging that a
uniform delivered price of a single seller violates the RobinsonPatman Act, says
"The discriminations by each said respondent * * * result, in
part, because of its failure to 'make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery' * * * and are
discriminatory to such an extent that the net prices paid by cus' 8 Matter of The Cement Institute et al, (1937) 37 F T C. 87, 117, reported on appeal as Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. F T. C. (C.C.A. 7, 1946),
157 F (2d) 533, cert. granted March 10, 1947 Count I charged violation of
Section 5 of the F T C. Act. Count II charged violation of the RobinsonPatman
Act.
9
'20
Page 117 of 37 F T.C.
Matter of the Rigid Steel Conduit Assn., (1944) 38 F T C. 534,
Par. 17c. Now pending on appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
21This theory of the Commission antedates the Robinson-Patman Act.
Mr. Freer, member of the Federal Trade Commission, testified before the
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on March 23, 1936, as follows
"The question of discrimination can only be gaged by the treatment the
seller accords to buyers in terms of what he has left after paying any sunis
actually defrayed by him for transportation. If, after subtracting from each
delivered price the sum actually defrayed by the seller for freight, the net
results are not identical, there is price discrimination. The price of the commodity is one thing, and the price of the transportation thereof is another.
"Such discrimination is inherent in delivered price systems." (Senate
document, "To Prevent Uniform Delivered Prices." Hearings before the
Committee on Interstate Commerce on Senate Bill 4055, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 312.)
22Robinson-Patman Act Symposium, (C.C.H.) New York State Bar
Association, New York City, January 22, 1946, p. 78.
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tomers located at or near its factory door in many instances'
amount to much more than the net prices realized by such respondent on chain and chain products of like grade and
' 23 quantity
sold to its customers located hundreds of miles away.
The Commission's complaint against the lead industry2 ' charges
that a uniform delivered price (within a zone) violates the Robinson-Patman Act through failure to make allowance for differences
in cost of delivery.
The position of the Commission has continued unchanged. The
complaints. issued February 14, 1947 against two clay sewer pipe
trade associations and their members 25 charge.
"* * * The discriminations by each said respondent thus ef-

fected are systematic and result in part because of its failure to
'make only due allowance for differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered' * * *"

V. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE AcT
In the absence of any court decisions directly passing on the
validity of a uniform delivered price, guidance must be sought in
the wording of the Act, its congressional history, and in court decisions under the Robinson-Patman Act on other pricing methods.
Wording of the Act
The Act prohibits "discrimination in price between different
purchasers of commodities." The immediate question is what
Congress meant by "price."
The purchaser's interest in a price is the cost to him at the
place he will use the commodity His ability to compete, which the
1.

inDocket No. 4878-filed 1942, ameided 1945 (Count II, Par. 6).
2
4Matter of National Lead Co. et al, Docket No. 5253, filed November
25, 1944. Count II of the complaint charged that a zone delivered price systern constituted two violations: first, the uniform price delivered within a
zone; and second, the differences in price between zones, as follows"
"PARAGRAPH EIGHT In using its aforesaid 'ZONE DELIVERED
PRICING METHOD AND PRACTICE,' each of the respondents, * * *
so quotes prices in its offers to sell that when it sells white lead * * * the
delivered cost on a specified quantity of white lead as paid by any one of
its customers located at or near the factory door of such respondent, amounts
to as much as the delivered cost on the same quantity of white lead as paid
-- to such respondent by any one of other customers located hundreds of miles
away in the same 'ZONE,' although substantial differences are involved in
the costs of delivery to such nearby customer and the more distantly located
ones."
"PARAGRAPH NINE: Systematic discriminations in net prices against
nearby. customers and in favor of their more distantly located customers are
inherent in the use of the aforesaid 'ZONE DELIVERED PRICING
METHOD
AND PRACTICE' * * *"
25
Matter of Clay Products Association et al, Docket No. 5483, Matter
of Clay-Sewer Pipe Association et al, Docket No. 5484, both issued February
14, 1947. (Count II, Par. 8.)
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Act seeks to preserve, depends on the cost to him at that point.
While the Act does not compel a seller to quote a delivered price,
where the seller chooses to quote a delivered price to the purchaser, that would seem to be the price in which discrimination is
forbidden. It is difficult to spell out from the text a requirement
that the freight paid by the seller be deducted to ascertain the price
in which discrimination is forbidden.
The Commission's further argument that the seller must make
due allowance for cost of transportation seems to disregard the
wording of the proviso that the Act shall not prevent "differentials
which make only due allowances for differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale or delivery * * *"

This proviso presupposes

differentials in price which are due to inclusion of cost of delivery
But if the word "price" means "mill net," the proviso is meaningless, since a mill net never includes transportation cost. The apparent intent of Congress was that the Act should not prevent
making due allowance. The Act does not say that the seller must
make due allowance. The word "only" in the phrase "only due
allowance" connotes a maximum, its use is inconsistent with interpreting the proviso as a requirement.
The argument of the Commission involves a further difficulty
If this proviso is interpreted to require the seller to make due,
that is, exact allowance for differences in the cost of transportation, it would necessarily follow that the seller must, in every sale,
make due, that is, exact allowance for differences not only in cost
of delivery but also in cost of manufacture and sale. Even the
Commission has not advanced this interpretation.
2.

Congresstonal History
The congressional history of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates clearly that Congress did not intend "price" to mean "mill
net." The Act, as reported to the House on March 31, 1935 by
the Committee on the Judiciary, contained the following provision
"5. That the word 'price' as used in this section 2, shall be
construed to mean the amount received by the vendor after deducting actual freight or cost of other transportation, if any, allowed
or defrayed by the vendor."
It was stricken from the Bill by an amendment offered by the
26
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
The Supreme Court, in the Corn Products case, in referring
to this proposed section 5, said
2680 Cong. Rec. 8223, 8224.
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"The practical effect of tlus provision would have been to
require that the price of all commodities sold in interstate commerce be computed on an f.o.b. factory basis, in order to avoid
the prohibited- discriminations m selling price. It would have
prohibited any system of uniform delivered prices, as well as any
basing point system of delivered prices. These effects were recognized in the Committee's report, see H. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 14, and in the debates upon the Robmson-Patman Bill.
Cf. 80 Cong. Rec. 8118, 8223-8224. Indeed, the provision would
have prohibited such a multiple basing point system as that in
Cement Manafacturers Assn. v. United States, supra, as well as
the present system.
-Such a drastic change m existing pricing systems as would
have been effected by the proposed amendment engendered opposition, which finally led to the withdrawal of the provision by the
House Committee on the Judiciary. 80 Cong. Rec. 8102, 8140, 8224.
We think this legislative history indicates only that Congress was
unwilling to require f.o.b. factory pricing, and thus to make all
uniform delivered price systems and all basing point systems
illegal per se. On the contrary we think that it left the legality of
such systems to be determined accordingly as they might be
restricted
within the reach of Sec. 2(a), as enacted, and its more
27
prohibitions of discriminations in delivered prices."
The Commission is now asking the courts to require sellers to use
the f.o.b. mill pricing method. This is exactly what Congress refused
to do. The court in the Cenent case said
"If this pricing system (freight equalization) which Congress
has over the years steadfastly refused to declare illegal, although
vigorously urged to do so, is now to be outlawed .by the courts, it
will mark the high tide in judicial usurpation."2 8
Court Decisions
No court has directly passed upon the legality of the uniform
delivered price under the Robinson-Patman Act.
In 1945, the Supreme Court in tvo cases29 ruled upon pricing
f.o.b. a basing point other than the point of shipment.
Corn Products had two plants, one in Chicago and one in
Kansas City. Sales were made at delivered prices computed by
adding to a base price at Chicago the freight from Chicago to
destination, regardless of whether shipment was made from Cluicago or Kansas City. The result was that on shipments from
Kansas City to any point where the freight was less than from
3.

27Page 737 of 324 U. S.
2
28Page 573 of 157-F.-.(2d).
9CoM Products Refimng Co. v. F T. C., (1945) 324 U. S. 726, 65 S. Ct
961, 89 L. Ed. 1320; F. T. C. v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., (1945) 324
U. S. 746, 65 S. Ct. 971, 89 L. Ed.,1339.;
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Chicago to that point, the delivered price included more than the
actual freight. This was called "phantom freight" and was held
by the Supreme Court to be a discrimination in violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. The decision in the Corn Products case
was summarized by the Court in the Staley case as follows
"In the Corn Products Refining Company case, we hold that
this price system of respondents' competitor in part involves unlawful price discriminations, to the extent that freight differentials
enter into the computation of price, as a result of the selection as
a basing point of a place distant from the point of production
and shipment. '"3
The Staley Company, a competitor of Corn Products, had its
plant at Decatur, Illinois. To meet Corn Products' competition,
Staley quoted delivered prices computed by adding to a base price at
Chicago the freight from Chicago to destination. The result was
that buyers in Decatur, next to the plant, paid more than buyers
in Chicago by the amount of the freight from Chicago to Decatur
This the Court held involved phantom freight which constituted
a discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The
Court rejected the defense that the price discriminations were made
in good faith to meet competition as permitted by the Act, saying
"Respondents have never attempted to establish their own nondiscriminatory price system, and then reduced their price when
necessary to meet competition. Instead they have slavishly followed
in the first instance a pricing policy which, in their case, resulted
in systematic discriminations, by charging their customers upon
shipments from Decatur, the Chicago base price plus their competitors' actual costs of delivery from Chicago." 3'
The Court, by dictum, upheld a uniform delivered price, as
follows
"But it does not follow that respondents may never absorb
freight when their factory price plus actual freight is higher than
their competitors' price, or that sellers, by so doing, may not
maintain a uniform delivered price at all pontis
of delivery, for
32
in that event there is no discriminationin price."
In 1946 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in the Cement case, vacated a Commission order condemning the
freight equalization method used in the cement industry Cement
is sold at a delivered price made up of a base price, plus actual
freight or the freight from a nearer competitor's mill. This is the
freight equalization method which, it will be recalled, results in a
30
Page 753 of 324 U.
31
32Pages 754, 755 of

S.
324 U. S.
Page 757 of 324 U. S. (Italics supplied.)
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uniform mill net mthe territory in which freight from seller's mill
is less than or equal to the freight from competitors' mills, but a
lower and varying mill net on all shipments outside this territory.
in both territories, the delivered price varies.
The Commission charged this violated the Robinson-Patman
Act, and found"The multiple basing-point delivered-price system used by the
corporate respondents in the sale of cement is a discriminatory
method of pricing. This is true whether the systematic variations
in price are viewed before or after' '33consideration is given to the
cost of delivery by common carrier.
"* * * that in the circumstances of this case the systematic
discriminations in mill nets by each respondent seller among its
various customers which necessarily result from the use of the
multiple basmg-point delivered-price system are discriminations
in pr-ce that are unlawful under subsection (a) of Section 2 of the
Clayton Act as amended, * ** ",34
The Commission, in its brief, argued
"If there ever were any doubt that a seller's systematic variation in his mill net prices reflecting a systematic effort to avoid
making due allowance in his delivered prices for differences in his
actual cost of delivery, constitutes a discrimination in price among
his respective customers, that doubt should have been laid to rest
by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Corn Products Refinzg
Co. v Federal Trade Commisston and Federal Trade Comnnfission
v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. decided April 23, 1945 (324 U. S. 726,
746). In both cases the price discrimination held to be a violation of
Section 2(a) consisted of a variation in mill net prices which coinprehended a range inclusive of both 'phantom freight' and so
called freight absorption. In both cases the variation in mill net
prices reflected with mathematical precision the failure to make
due allowance for differences in cost of delivery. It was and is the
only conceivable test and measure of the existence of discrimination
in delivered prices."35
The court disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of
the Supreme Court's decisions in these two cases, saying"The Commission in its brief * * * makes the bold statement
that the illegality of the variation in mill net prices has been laid
to rest by the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Corn Products
and Staley-cases. We do-not so understand. We do understand from
those decisions that when a product is sold from a base other than
the point of actual shipment and phantom freight thereby collected,
a discrimination in violation of the Clayton Act results. Certainly
the court in those decisions did not hold that freight absorption
33
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was discriminatory, in fact, that question was expressly left open.
In the Corn Products case, the court stated (page 735) 'We have
no occasion to decide whether a basing point system such as that
in the Cement case is permissible under the Clayton Act, in view
of the provisions of Sec. 2(b), permitting reductions in price in
order to meet a competitor's equally low price.' "81
The court, with one judge dissenting, vacated the Commission's order, holding that the Commission had made no finding
of conspiracy 37 and that in the absence of such a finding, the
freight equalization system used by the cement industry was not
illegal.
A reversal by the Supreme Court of the holding of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Cewent case would not be conclusive as
to the validity of the uniform delivered price by a single seller.
In the Cement case, as was shown above, the delivered price to the
buyer varies at different destinations, according to the freight rate
from the nearest mill. A decision by the Supreme Court that such
variation constitutes a discrimination, not justified as made in
good faith to meet the equally low price of a competitor, would not
be a holding that a uniform delivered price constituted a discrimination.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. The context of the Act gives no indication that the word
"price" means "mill net." On the contrary, it must in come cases
mean the delivered price, otherwise the provision permitting differentials which make only due allowances for differences in cost
of delivery, is meaningless, since delivery costs can never be
part of a mill net.
2. Congress refused to define price as meaning the mill net,
and this refusal was recognized by the Supreme Court in the
Corn Products case.
3. The Commission's interpretation of the Act as requiring the
seller to make exact allowance for differences in cost of transportation (although apparently not of manufacture or sale) requires disregard of the plain meaning of the words used.
36
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is Cement Manufacturers Protective Assn. v. U. S., (1925) 268 U. S. 588,
45 S.37Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104.
The Commission's Petition for Writs of Certiorari filed in the Supreme
Court January 20, 1947, in the assignment of error, maintains that the
Commission did make findings of combination. However, the Petition also
states that the Supreme Court should settle the question,
"whether systematic absorption of freight, just as systematic collection
of phantom freight, may constitute an illegal price discrimination."

UNIFORM DELIVERED PRICE

613

4. The Supreme Court, by dictum in the Staley case, said that
a uniform delivered price involves no discrimination in price.
5. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, m
the Cewment case, rejected the Commission's contention that the
Robinson-Patman Act requires the seller to net the same f.o.b.
mill on all sales.
The conclusion that the Commission's position is legally untenable seems inescapable.

